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INTRODUCTION 
Debates about morality take many different forms, and occur 
on several levels. On the most theoretical level, one may want 
to ask about the general status of the existence and origin of 
moral laws. Some take the position that moral laws are universal 
and necessary: that they apply to all rational beings, with no 
exceptions. In other words, moral laws have an a priori status, 
and cannot be otherwise. According to this position, then, there 
is a definite "right" and "wrong" regarding moral decisions. 
Immanuel Kant is a supporter of this position. He establishes 
the moral law as an a priori truth by grounding it in the 
categories of thought (i.e. time, space, causality, etc.), which 
are, for him, given a priori. If Kant is correct, then the 
categories of thought are programmed, by nature, into the 
consciousness of a rational being. They cannot be otherwise, 
and, hence, the moral law is universal also. 
Emile Durkheim agrees that morality is grounded in the 
categories of thought, and moreover, that the moral law is a 
universal law. However, he disagrees with Kant as to the origin 
of the categories of thought. The categories of thought are not 
programmed by nature, but rather, were constructed by primitive 
societies in order to fit the particular needs of each society. 
•
 
Durkheim owes much of his ethical theory to Kant, and 
wishes to retain a great deal of Kantianism in the theory. 
However, he does so at great cost to his own theory. Instead of 
reconciling the competing claims of rationalism and empiricism, 
which is his ultimate goal in utilizing Kant, Durkheim ends up 
with an ethical theory which is full of contradictions and which 
is basically a solely empiricist account of morality. By 
exploring both Kant's and Durkheim's ethical theories, I will 
demonstrate both the problems inherent in Durkheim's attempt to 
reconcile rationalism and empiricism, and his failure in 
retaining a universalistic account of morality, given the 
context of his theory. The result is an ethical theory with 
relativistic implications. 
KANT'S CONCEPTS OF FREE WILL AND RATIONALITY 
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC A PRIORI 
Kant makes the distinction between analytic and synthetic 
a priori principles in order to establish certain metaphysical 
principles such as: "Every event has a cause," as a priori 
priciplesi that is, principles which can be known by pure reason 
(Korsgaard). In this way, Kant hopes to establish that we, as 
rational beings, can know such things as causation, and thus 
avoid Humean skepticism. Kant realizes that the principle "every 
event has a cause" is not an analytic a priori principle, 
because with an analytic a priori principle, the predicate will 
be contained in the concept of the sUbject. In other words, an 
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analytic jUdgement can be thought of as a definition, which, if 
denied, would produce a contradiction. A synthetic a priori 
principle, on the other hand, must be demonstrated, for its 
denial is not a contradiction. 
Now, Hume shows us that the principle of causation cannot 
be derived from experience, thus, Kant will establish it as a 
synthetic a priori principle (Kant, 1934). He does this by 
making a distinction between the noumenal world and the 
phenomenal world. Instead of assuming that our beliefs about the 
external world must correspond to the objects of the external 
world, Kant posits that the objects must conform to our beliefs. 
Thus, the world as we experience it, the phenomenal world, is 
not necessarily an accurate reflection of the world as it 
actually is, the noumenal world. In a sense, rational beings are 
"programmed", by nature, with what Kant calls "categories of 
thought", which help us to make sense of a seemingly chaotic 
world. One of these categories of thought is causality. 
Just as the metaphysical principle of causality is a 
synthetic a priori principle, so must be the moral law 
(Korsgaard). Kant establishes this fact by appealing to a 
distinction between hypothetical imperatives, and categorical 
imperatives. A hypothetical imperative is an analytic jUdgement, 
in the sense that when one wills one or other end, one can 
determine the means to that end merely by analyz ing the end 
itself. In other words, the means are inherent in the end, and 
are "indispensibly necessary" to obtain that end. The moral law, 
-however, is not a hypothetical imperative, but rather a 
categorical imperative. Korsgaard explains: 
Our duties hold for us regardless of what we want. A 
moral rule does not say 'do this if you want that', 
but simply 'do this'. It is expressed in a categorical 
imperative. (p.208) 
Because the means to morality cannot be found by analyzing 
the end, the moral law cannot be an analytic principle, and so 
must be established synthetically. In this way, Kant can 
establish the moral law as a necessary principle which holds 
universally. The universality and necessity of the moral law is 
an indication of its a pr~ori status, and, by inference, its 
grounding in the human reason. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF FREE WILL TO KANT 
Because the categnrica1 imperative is synthetic, Kant must 
establish the link between morality and the concept of a 
rational will by means of a third "agent". He does this by 
appealing to freedom of the will. He presents the challenge: 
[I] f we can now discover the means to show that 
freedom does in fact belong to the human will (and 
thus to the will of all rational beings), then it will 
have been proved not only that pure reason can be 
practical, but also that it alone, and not the 
empirically conditioned reason is unconditionally 
practical. (1956, p.16) 
Kant believes that only a free will can determine an 
unconditional practical law, which, to him, is the moral law: a 
categorical imperative. Moreover, the unconditional practical 
law also implies freedom of the will. Korsgaard states: 
Kant will ask 'how would a free will with nothing 
constraining or guiding it determine its actions? and 
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he will argue that the answer is 'by the moral
 
law.' (p. 209)
 
However, Kant has a problem with establishing the freedom 
of a will, because when he gives the synthetic a priori 
principle "every event has a cause", he necessarily precludes 
the possibility of there being a first or spontaneous cause, 
which is the only thing that a free will could be. In other 
words, given that our wills are sUbject to the laws of 
causation, they must be determined, and hence, cannot be free, 
for, in the phenomenal world, there cannot be a first, or 
spontanteous cause. 
Kant solves this problem by pointing to another implication 
of the distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal world. 
Because the phenomenal world is temporal, spontaneous causation 
is not possible. However, the noumenal world is not sUbject to 
temporal laws, and there can be a spontaneous cause, even if it 
is not knowable (Korsgaard). So, the mere possibility of there 
being a first cause is enough to establish that a will can be 
free. 
KANT'S MORAL LAW 
Given that we understand Kant's concept of free will, we 
can better define Kant's concept of rationality and how it ties 
in with free will, and the moral law. As I stated earlier, the 
phenomenal self is sUbject to the laws of causation, and thus a 
human being, in this regard, is sUbject to his or her personal 
whims and desires, which are not rational: 
-All practical principles which presuppose an object 
(material) of the faculty of desire as the determining 
ground of the will are without exception empirical and 
can furnish no practical laws. (Kant, 1956, p. 19) 
What Kant is implying here is that when one's principle, or 
maxim, is based on one's desires, the universality of the 
principle is necessarily undermined, since personal desires 
cannot be objective, and do not necessarily hold for all 
rational beings. A principle which cannot be universal, cannot 
be a law, and thus, cannot be a foundation for the morality of 
a rational being. 
The only way to make a sUbjective practical principle into 
a practical universal law is to analyze the form of the 
principle, and not the content (Kant, 1956). This leads Kant 
into the first formulation of the categorical imperative: 
[A]ct that the maxim of your will could always hold at 
the same time as a principle establishing universal 
law. (Kant, 1956, p. 30) 
This universal law is, to Kant, the moral law. By denying 
that personal desires can be the determining ground of the will, 
Kant establishes the moral law as a law based on pure 
rationality or reason. It is important to note further that the 
autonomy of the will is what establishes obligation to the moral 
law, and that the duties which accompany the moral law cannot be 
otherwise, as is the case when personal desires are the 
determining ground of the will. 
SYNOPSIS OF KANT'S FORMULATION OF THE MORAL LAW 
The moral law, according to Kant, is a necessary universal 
law, which holds for all rational beings. The concepts of free 
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will and rationality are essential to Kant in order to establish 
the moral law as a universal, necessary truth. Tied in with 
these concepts is the idea that personal desires cannot be the 
determining ground of the will, in order for a being to be 
acting rationally, morally, and with a free will. In other 
words, these three concepts necessarily preclude the use of 
personal desires as the determining ground of the will. 
DURKREIM'S ETHICAL THEORY 
KANT'S GENERAL IMPACT ON DURKHEIM 
At this point, I feel it necessary to emphasize the 
profound impact that Kant's ethical theory had overall on 
Durkheim's formulation of his ethical theory, and his quest to 
establish sociology as a positive science on morality. Kant 
establishes the moral law as a law based on pure reason, thus 
implying that this law is a necessary truth. Durkheim, however, 
will turn the moral law into a variety of contingent truths. 
From this point, he can then formulate a science for studying 
these laws: the science of sociology. 
Durkheim believes that these laws do not emerge out of the 
individual '$ will, transcending from the phenomenal world to the 
noumenal world, as Kant believes. Rather, these laws emerge from 
the "collective conscience", which is, in essence, society. 
Whereas Kant believes that each 1ndividual, who is acting 
rationally and with a will which is free, will determine the 
moral law as an individual, Durkheim believes that the moral law 
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is created at the time which society is created, and exists as 
society does, prior to the individual (Durkheim, 1915). The 
foundation for this belief lies in Durkheim's concept of the 
origin of the categories of thought. It is important to 
investigate this concept, for this is the main foundation for 
Durkheim's divergence from Kant. 
THE ORIGIN OF THE CATEGORIES OF THOUGHT 
As I stated earlier, Kant believes that the categories of 
thought are programmed into the consciousness of every rational 
being. In other words, rational beings are given categories such 
as time, space, and causality (among others) by nature. The 
categories are necessary in order for a rational being to 
organize his experiences. 
Durkheim urges, however, that these categories are not 
given by nature, but rather, were formed by primitive societies 
in order to fit the particular needs of each society. In The 
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, he investigates 
primitive religions in order to support this belief. 
Durkheim believes that religion is not as much an enricher 
of the intellect as it is a contributor to the formation of the 
intellect (1915). Given that this is true, all we need to do is 
to investigate primitive religions in order to discover how the 
contribution was made. Durkheim asserts that in every primitive 
religion, categories of space, time, cause, etc., are found 
(1915). He infers, then, that these categories are "born in 
religion, and of religion: they are a product of religious 
-thought" (1915, p. 22). 
The goal that Durkheim has in mind, in arguing that 
categories of thought are socially constructed, is to reconcile 
the conflicting claims of rationalism and empiricism. He states: 
For some, the categories cannot be derived from 
experience: they are logically prior to it and 
condition it ... For this reason they are said to be a 
priori. Others, however, hold that they are 
constructed and made up of pieces and bits, and that 
the individual is the artisan of this construction. 
(1915, p. 26) 
Durkheim then offers objections to both viewpoints. The 
rationalists, such as Kant, must posit certain entities such as 
transcendancy of the mind and God, in order to uphold their 
theories. Durkheim argues that there is neither an explanation 
nor is there a justification for these postulations (1915). 
Furthermore, Durkheim urges that "the categories of human 
thought are never fixed in anyone definite form; they are made, 
unmade, and remade incessantly; they change with places and 
times" (1915, p. 28). 
Empiricism, also, is sUbject to serious criticism by 
Durkheim. The most compelling criticism is that empiricism 
deprives the categories of thought of all their characteristic 
properties (1915). The categories under the empiricist doctrine 
are no longer universal and necessary, as they should be. 
Durkheim's argument can be laid out as follows: 
1. Categories impose themselves upon us. 
2. Categories are independent of every particular sUbject. 
3. Therefore, categories are not individual and subjective, 
but rather, they are universal and necessary. 
-4. Empirical data (i.e. sensations) are essentially 
individual and sUbjective. 
5. Therefore, categories are not empirical data. (1915) 
A rationalist would surely agree with this line of 
argument, but it is quite clear that Durkheim is unable to argue 
this point consistentlY, given the context of his theory. 
Durkheim is attributing universality and necessity to something 
which he also argues is "made, unmade and remade" (1915, p. 28). 
Unless Durkheim has some notion of universality and necessity 
which he has not stipulated, and which differs greatly from the 
common philosophical meanings of the two terms, he is plainly 
contradicting himself. To say that something is universal and 
necessary is to say that this thing holds true in all possible 
worlds, and cannot be otherwise. The fact asserted by Durkheim 
that categories are a product of collective thought (i.e. of 
society), necesarily undermines the position that they are true 
in all possible worlds. For example, one can easily conceive, 
using Durkheim' s scheme, of two distinct primitive societies 
coming to two completely different ideas of time and cause. 
Suppose that one society constructs cause such that the event 
occurring first temporally, causes the second event, whereas the 
other society constructs cause such that the first event is 
caused by the second event, in a temporal sequence. This thought 
experiment is enough to show that Durkheim' s concept of the 
categories cannot include a concept of universality. 
The conclusion which I have reached is that Durkheim ends 
up sacrificing the rationalist aspect of his theory and is 
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really supporting only an empiricist theory. Keeping this in 
mind, we must consider a further implication of Durkheim' s 
theory with regard to his reformation of Kant's ethical theory. 
Given that the categories of thought are formed by society and 
can, as I have shown, vary from society to society, the 
implication is that morality, which is grounded in the 
categories, can also vary from society to society. Thus, Kant's 
universalistic ethical theory becomes Durkheim's relativistic 
ethical theory. Now, if we closely examine Durkheim's theory, 
paying particular attention to the Kantian concepts which 
Durkheim employs, we will be able to discover further problems 
which are inherent in attempting to re-formulate Kant's 
universalistic ethical theory into a theory with relativistic 
implications. 
THE THREE ELEMENTS OF MORALITY 
Morality, according to Durkheim, consists of three main 
elements, these being: discipline, attachment to social groups, 
and autonomy. The first element, discipline, involves the 
concepts of authority, and regularity of conduct. These concepts 
somewhat parallel Kant's notion of duty and adherence to the 
moral law, but there are some aspects of these concepts which I 
do not believe Kant would accept. 
By "regularity of conduct", Durkheim means: 
[M]orality consists of a system of rules which 
predetermine conduct. They state how one must act in 
given situations; and to behave properly is to obey 
conscientiously. (1961, p. 24) 
So, the moral person will be consistent in his conduct, and 
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act according to these already established rules. According to 
Durkheim, these rules already existed, apart from an individual 
arriving at these rules through pure reason. Kant's main 
mistake, in Durkheim's view, is in believing that the moral rule 
resides entirely in the individual conscience (1961). Durkheim 
proposes instead that the moral rule is a part of the 
"collective conscience", just as the categories are. In other 
words, moral rules are a product of society, not individual 
rationality. 
Kant makes the further mistake of believing that morality 
is expressed in a general, abstract form, which can then be 
applied to individual circumstances. Durkheim takes issue with 
this position, stating: 
If we see morality as it is, we see that it consists 
in an infinity of special rUles, fixed and specific, 
which order man's conduct in those different 
situations in which he finds himself most frequently. 
(1961, p. 25) 
Thus, the fact that these rules already exist, and are at 
the disposal of a person in any given situation, helps to ensure 
the regularity of conduct. 
Moreover, these moral rules are invested with a certain 
authority, whereby they are obeyed simply because they command. 
Here again, we can see the influence of Kant, and his 
formulation of a categorical imperative: 
[I]t is a certain and incontestable fact that an act 
is not moral, even when it is in substantial 
aggreement with moral rules, if the consideration of 
adverse consequences has determined it. Here ... for the 
rule to be obeyed as it ought to be, it is necessary 
for us to yield, not in order to avoid disagreeable 
-results or some moral or material punishment, but very 
simply because we ought to, regardless of the 
consequences our conduct may have for us. One must 
obey a moral precept out of respect for it and for 
this reason alone (Durkheim, 1961, p. 30). 
Durkheim wants to deny that utilitarian considerations can 
play any role in a moral decision, for, in considering utility, 
one necessarily undermines the morality of the action. It is 
essential to see how closely this parallels Kant's concept of 
morality, for it appears as if Durkheim directly borrows this 
idea from Kant. 
The question is, then: From where do these rules derive 
their authority? Kant answers that a being acting rationally and 
with free will, will necessarily conclude that this or that 
action is the moral action in a given situation, and that the 
action cannot be otherwise. In other words, the moral rule is 
given to us a priori, and, thus, is based upon pure reason. A j 
purely rational being could not even conceive of acting in any 
other way. 
Durkheim, on the other hand, answers this question by 
appealing to our attachment to social groups, which is the 
second element to morality. Durkheim, in opposition to Kant, 
states: 
We cannot perform an act which is not in some way 
meaningful to us simply because we have been commanded 
to do so. It is psychologically impossible to pursue 
an end to which we are indifferent ...Morality must, 
then, be not only obligatory but also desirable and 
desired. This desirability is the second 
characteristic of all moral acts. (1953, p. 45) 
So, where does this desirability come from? Durkheim will 
answer: from the social groups of which we are a part. In other 
words, we, as social beings, receive positive and negative 
sanctions for certain actions we perform, depending upon whether 
these actions are considered moral or immoral by the collective 
conscience. These sanctions are determined synthetically, not 
analytically, and thus: 
It is not the intrinsic nature of my action that 
produces the sanction which follows, but the fact that 
the act violates the rule that forbids it. (Durkheim, 
1953, p. 42) 
The Kantian influence is undoubtedly inherent in this 
passage, but it is given a sociological bent, which results in 
some contradictory notions in Durkheim's moral theory. First of 
all, with regard to Durkheim's use of the texms "analytic" and 
"synthetic", it seems to me as if he doesn't fully undertand 
Kant's use of these concepts. I think he loses sight of the fact 
that the terms "synthetic" and "analytic" are used to describe 
a priori principles; that is, principles founded upon pure 
reason. This is precisely why Kant denies that the moral law 
comes from anywhere except for the individual who is acting 
entirely from reason. This is also why personal desires cannot 
playa role in moral decisions. Actions based upon desires, to 
Kant, cannot be rational, because they are not based upon pure 
reason, but rather, are based upon empirical grounds. As we can 
see, Durkheim's problems here stem from the problems with his 
theory on the origin of the categories of thought. Because 
Durkheim cannot posit any a priori truths, given the context of 
his theory, he cannot speak of morality in an a priori sense. 
Durkheim's conclusion must be, then, that moral laws are not 
universal and necessary, and thus, they can vary from society to 
society. 
The second inconsistency in Durkheim's theory results when 
Durkheim, after denying that utilitarian considerations can play 
any role in a moral action, and can actually undermine moral 
acts, states that positive and negative sanctions play a key 
role in instigating moral actions by the individual. What are 
these sanctions if not utilitarian considerations? If Durkheim 
is saying that our attachment to social groups is a factor in 
acting morally, he is, in essence, saying that moral actions, at 
least in part, rely on considerations of utility, on the part of 
the individual actor. Again, Durkheim presents a Kantian concept 
which he is not able to employ, because of his failure to 
reconcile rationalism and empiricism. 
Putting these considerations aside for the moment, let us 
turn to Durkheim1s third element of morality: autonomy. Durkheim 
believes that the denial of individual autonomy is contrary to 
morality; thus, the autonomy of the moral agent is 
indispensible. Durkheim does not give any clear indication of 
what his concept of autonomy is, except to say that an 
individual is acting autonomously when he makes a moral decision 
based upon reliable knowledge. The idea that Durkheim elaborates 
upon is that as primitive societies move away from a mechanical 
solidarity, where rules are obeyed simply by the authority with 
which they are invested, to an organic solidarity, moral rules 
-are obeyed by individuals who have freely and rationally chosen 
to obey these moral rules, based upon reliable knowledge of all 
of the alternative avalable actions. Moreover, in the upheaval 
of societies under revolution, where is a person to look in 
order to find the moral rule? Durkheim will answer: in that 
individual's own rational capacities and his or her ability to 
act as an autonomous moral agent. 
It appears that Durkheim is using Kant's concept of free 
will in order to describe the autonomy of the individual, at 
least in an organic society. However, it is essential that we 
point out the implications of Durkheim's use of Kant's concept 
of free will, because I believe that Durkheim doesn't fully 
understand what Kant is saying about what free will must be, if 
it exists. 
The essential thing to remember about Kant's concept of 
free will is that a will is only free when it transcends from 
the phenomenal world to the noumenal world. In the phenomenal 
world, the individual is subject to influence from desires and 
personal whims, which hinder rationality. Desires are 
empirically given, and, since pure reason (i.e. rationality) is 
not empirical, but rather, given a priori, desires cannot be 
rational. So, desires hinder a will from acting rationally and, 
thus, they hinder a will from acting freely. In essence, a will 
that is free must be free from the phenomenal world. 
Thus, it appears that Durkheim cannot maintain Kant's 
concept of free will and still hold to his original ethical 
theory, because he does incorporate personal desires into his 
theory. Now, given that Kant's concept of free will is an 
accurate description of how free will must be conceptualized, 
the logical conclusion would be that, given the context of 
Durkheim's ethical theory, he cannot maintain any concept of an 
autonomous moral agent. 
What reasons do we have for accepting Kant's concept of 
free will as a true description of what free will would have to 
be, if it existed? We have to show that it is not possible for 
freedom to be anything other than a spontaneous, or first cause, 
because if we believe otherwise, we will fall into the trap of 
determinism, which necessarily precludes the possibility of free 
will, contrary to Durkheim's opinion. 
In order to show this, we must return to the factor which 
initially motivates Kant to formulate his metaphysical theory. 
Kant wants to establish that we can know of causality through an 
a priori jUdgement. Hume had already established that causality 
could not be determined through empiricism, so the only way to 
save all scientific endeavors (inclUding Durkheim's) from 
skepticism is to establish causality as a synthetic a priori 
principle. The metaphysical principle of cause, which Kant wants 
to rescue is: "Every event has a cause." We are thus faced with 
choosing one of two contradictory notions about causal i ty. 
Either causality involves an infinite regress, where every cause 
has its own cause, thus leaving us with a deterministic account 
of the world, including the will; or, there must be some cause 
-by which all other events and causes come about. In order for 
free will to exist, it must be a spontaneous cause, for 
otherwise, it is determined by a different cause, and cannot be 
free (simply by definition). So, Kant's concept of free will is 
the only logically possible description of free will. 
Thus, we can see that Durkheim makes a mistake in 
incorporating the element of autonomy into his ethical theory. 
Given that Kant I s free will was a necessary element for a 
rational being, and that Durkheim has been unable to uphold a 
theory which includes rationality, it appears that Durkheim's 
theory would fare better if he were to disregard free will. In 
fact, none of the Kantian concepts which Durkheim employs can 
fit in to his theory without contradiction, and this fact leads 
me to the conclusion that Durkheim should not have even 
attempted to utilize Kant in formulating his theory. 
CONCLUSION 
The argument that I have given is that there are serious 
problems in Durkheim' s attempt to combine Kant's concepts of 
rationality, universality, and free will, into a theory which 
has empiricism as a foundation. The fact, asserted by Durkheim, 
that the categories of thought are socially constructed, and not 
given a priori, is the factor which leads to the failure of his 
goal to reconcile rationalism and empiricism. Furthermore, 
Durkheim ends up with an theory of ethical relativism, rather 
than a universalistic ethical theory. I do not believe that this 
-is a position which Durkheim wishes to support. There are many 
indications that my belief is true, but the most compelling 
indication is that Durkheim wants to maintain the universality 
and necessity of the categories of thought, which he believes 
are the foundation for morality. If the categories are not 
universal, then neither is the moral law. As I stated earlier my 
general feeling is that Durkheim might have fared better with 
his theory had he disregarded the Kantian position on morality 
and stuck to a solely empiricist account of ethics. 
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